Recent research has raised questions about whether current medical definitions of death adequately take into account the possibility that conscious experience might persist briefly after after life-sustaining organ function ceases. This has been proposed by Anna Fowler, a student researcher at Arizona State University, whose work was presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Drawing on a meta-review of near-death experience (NDE) reports and clinical resuscitation studies, Fowler argued that death should be viewed not as a single moment, but as a “gradual, interruptible process”.
Her analysis cited reports from revived cardiac arrest patients who recalled conscious experiences during periods when their brains appeared “electrically inactive”. She noted that up to 20% of heart attack survivors described awareness during resuscitation, and referred to studies showing surges in brain activity near the point of death. On this basis, Fowler suggested that elements of consciousness might persist briefly beyond traditional clinical indicators of death.
At first glance, this appears to challenge conventional medical definitions. Yet the way the evidence is framed suggests a more conservative approach; one that avoids engaging with the most problematical elements of the data—that of out-of-body experiences (OBEs).
Fowler’s research emphasises auditory recollections: patients hearing voices, instructions or conversations among medical staff. These memories are presented as evidence that consciousness can persist into early stages of death. Hearing often remains functional longer than vision under hypoxia or anaesthesia, and fragmentary auditory functioning can occur without full awareness, and does not need a fully functional cortex. By focusing on auditory recall, Fowler’s argument remains within the bounds of materialist neuroscience, avoiding direct confrontation with the assumption that consciousness is produced by the brain—and sidestepping the radical implications raised by other NDE phenomena, namely OBEs.
Fowler’s hypothesis relies on the idea that the brain is profoundly compromised: starved of oxygen and functionally “dead”. Yet the clarity of the reported auditory experiences sits uneasily with this premise.
Severe cerebral hypoxia does not preserve lucid cognition. While rudimentary auditory processing may persist, semantic comprehension (understanding speech, recognising speakers and later recalling structured dialogue) depends on cortical networks that degrade early under oxygen deprivation. The more coherent and intelligible the reported experiences are, the less compatible they become with the physiological state being invoked to explain them.
Auditory recall is, therefore, being asked to do contradictory work: demonstrating profound physiological compromise while exhibiting cognitive clarity. This tension highlights a limitation in relying solely on auditory NDE reports.
OBEs present a different and more challenging type of evidence. Individuals report perceiving events from an external vantage point with visual and spatial detail. OBEs cannot be easily explained by residual brain activity or memory reconstruction, as they imply perception independent of the body’s sensory apparatus.
If OBEs are taken seriously, the hypoxia problem disappears. Consciousness would not require neural functioning, and both auditory and visual experiences could occur even under profound oxygen deprivation. Yet Fowler’s analysis excludes OBEs, possibly because they challenge the foundational materialist assumptions of her hypothesis.
By sidelining OBEs, her research retains credibility within mainstream neuroscience while gesturing towards the possibility of lingering awareness. OBEs are not dismissed for being weak, but because they are too strong, and require either direct falsification or acceptance of their non-material implications.
In this light, Fowler’s selective emphasis can be seen as an attempt to rationalise away the most problematical elements of the data. Death becomes “gradual” and “interruptible”, but consciousness is never shown to operate outside the brain.
Fowler’s research correctly highlights that death is a process: biological functions do not cease simultaneously, and the timing of consciousness near the point of death may be more complex than previously assumed. However, by emphasising auditory recall while excluding OBEs, her research appears to sidestep evidence that challenges materialist explanations, rather than confront it directly. For if consciousness can persist beyond the brain, OBEs are the clearest and most compelling evidence, and deserve attention in research.
